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The Changing Role of the Prime Rate
Changes in the prime lending rate receive con-
siderable publicity as a barometer of credit mar-
ket conditions. It is not clear, however, that this
attention is warranted, particularly since the role
of the prime rate in lending has diminished over
the last 15 years. For example, although the prime
rate now is used as a benchmark rate for certain
types of consumer loans, its use as a benchmark
for business and agricultural loans has declined.
It is now only one option among several which
borrowers may choose. These other benchmarks
include such market-determined rates as the
London Interbank Offer Rate (L1BOR), the rate on
bank certificates of deposit (CDs), and Treasury
bill rates. Moreover, because banks are faced
with increasing competition from direct issue
markets like the commercial paper market, they
have had to change their prime-based loan pric-
ing strategies. This Letter explores the changing
role of the prime rate, with a focus on the way
competition has influenced its behavior in recent
years.
The role of the prime rate
Historically, the prime lending rate has served as
the benchmark rate on short-term business and
agricultural loans. This benchmark, or base rate,
was the rate a bank charged its best, most credit-
worthy customers; all other borrowers typically
were quoted rates at a spread over prime, de-
pending on their risk characteristics and those
of the projects being financed.
The level of the prime rate quoted by a given
bank depends on the bank's costs, including its
operating costs and its cost of funds, which is
closely tied to the level of market interest rates.
The prime rate also reflects the bank's competi-
tive circumstances, including the level of compe-
tition from other intermediaries as well as from
the commercial paper market and other direct
issue markets.
As noted above, alternatives to the prime rate
are used as benchmarks now; however, it is im-
portant to note that banks still quote benchmark
rates, in part to assure bank borrowers that when
banks reprice their loans upward, the repricing
will apply to all borrowers, not just a given bor-
rower. Moreover, banks use the prime rate to give
potential borrowers information regarding the
basic cost of loan funds. It is not expensive to
publicize the prime rate, whereas it would be
infeasible to post a "menu" of interest rates for
borrowers and loans of all possible types.
An anticompetitive rate?
Although banks may have always used
benchmark rates in their loan contracting, the
concept of a uniform, national prime rate was not
introduced until the 1930s, in the midst of the
Great Depression. Faced with relatively abun-
dant reserves, bankers feared cutthroat competi-
tion for scarce borrowers. in September,1933, an
article appeared in a banking journal promoting
the setting of a uniform prime rate, which would
serve as a floor for lending rates. The idea took
hold. Originally, then, the prime rate appears to
have been an anticompetitive device. A natural
question is to what degree the prime rate remains
anticompetitive.
Some argue that it still is an anticompetitive
device in the sense that it is sufficiently high to
generate profits in excess of a competitive return
on bank equity. They point to the limited varia-
tion in the prime rate across banks. Only occa-
sionally do the 30 large banks that announce
their prime rate on a regular basis have different
rates for any significant length of time. In fact,
this has happened only three times; once in
1967, once in 1968, and once in 1989, one of the
major banks made larger changes in its prime
than the others did, leaving a split prime for an
extended period.
Likewise, the prime rate charged by smaller
banks generally does not vary much from the
"prevailing prime rate" (that is, the most com-
mon rate posted by the 30 large banks men-
tioned above). Specifically, in the past four years,
the average prime rate has never varied from the
prevailing prime rate by more than 30 basis
points or so.FRBSF
The high uniformity of the prime across banks
means that if one bank changes its prime rate,
either up or down, other banks will quickly fol-
low suit. The result is that changes in the prime
appear to be initiated by a "leader" bank, with
other banks in a "follower" role. This is par-
ticularly evident among the 30 large banks
that regularly announce their prime rate.
Observers who argue that the prime is an anti-
competitive device interpret this leaderlfollower
set-up as a sign of market power on the part of
banks. In support of this view, they point to
leaderlfollower models of price-setting, which
show that such a set-up facilitates coordination
and discipline among implicitly colluding firms.
They also point out that the prime rate is rela-
tively stable compared with market interest rates,
and that it is slower to change when market rates
are falling than when market rates are rising.
Consequently, the prime is nearly always at or
above market rates. PiOponents of the anticom-
petitive school contend that this suggests that
implicit collusion leads to a prime rate that
exceeds funding costs to a degree that affords
banks excess profits.
Competitive dynamics
Many question this interpretation, however,
arguing that in competitive markets, collusion,
whether explicit or implicit, cannot succeed.
According to this view, even if banks as a group
were able to hold the line against the competi-
tion that would drive the prime rate to a level
consistent with normal profits, they would not
be able to prevent individual banks from taking
advantage of the opportunity to fully compete
on the loan rates charged individual borrowers.
Proponents of this view point out that as banks
have faced additional competition in loan mar-
kets in recent years, they have had to become
more competitive in their rate setting. For exam-
ple, in the mid-1970s, in the face of vigorous
competition from the commercial paper market,
banks began to grant some very short-term loans
to large borrowers at rates below the prime.
There is general agreement among observers that
most below-prime lending is aimed specifically
at preventing the defection of large and highly'
creditworthy customers in search of very short-
term credits. So, the prime is no longer an
absolute floor for loan rates.
Proponents of this view also argue that although
the prime rate is fairly stable relative to money
market rates, it is responsive to sustained upward
or downward movements in these rates. The
uniformity of the prime rate is merely a conse-
quence of the same competitive forces that dic-
tate uniform prices for a single commodity in any
competitive market. In this case the commodity
is a generic short-term business, consumer, or
agricultural loan. The leaderlfollower set-up
apparent in prime rate changes is, in this view,
simply a consequence of one bank having to
move first when market rates have changed.
In addition, newspaper reports indicate that the
prime rate's popularity as a benchmark for com-
mercial loan rates is eroding. Large corporate
customers, and even small- and mid-sized firms,
more often than in the past favor other base rates
such as L1BOR or a reference rate based on 30-
day certificates of deposit. With such market-
determined alternatives available, it is difficult to
argue that the prime offers banks much opportu-
nity to collude. This evidence seems to say that
the prime rate has become more sensitive to
competition from various sources.
A more responsive prime rate
The question whether the prime rate is com-
petitive or not can be investigated empirically.
The key issue is whether changes in loan (and
deposit) markets in recent years, such as the
extensive financial deregulation that occurred in
the early 1980s, have made the prime rate more
responsive to market press·ures. If so, the prime
rate likely has become more competitive. Thus,
changes over time in the relationship between
the prime rate and an open market rate, such as
the three-month Treasury bill rate, should provide
evidence on this issue.
In my investigation of this issue, a statistical
procedure known as vector autoregression (VAR)
was used. This method relates the current level of
each of the rates to the current level of the other,
as well as to past values of both ofthe rates.
From this, "impulse response functions" were
calculated for the prime rate and the Treasury bill
rate, showing the responses to a "typical" shock
to the Treasury bill rate. (The "tvDical" shock was
47 basis points, the average amount by which
the Treasury bill rate deviated from its average
level during the 1983 to 1990 period.) Two sets of
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with data from 1964 to 1982 and the other with
data from 1983 to 1990, and these are shown in
the chart. The chart shows, for example, that a
positive shock to Treasury bill rates would be
associated with a simultaneous rise in the prime
rate of about 37 basis points, and that the effects




These findings suggest that by linking banks'
own cost of funds more closely with market
interest rates, the financial deregulation that
occurred in the early 1980s caused the prime rate
to become more closely linked with market inter-
est rates. The change appears to be significant,
suggesting that the mark-up has declined or even
disappeared. Intensified competition from the
commercial paper market in recent years, as well
as advances in technology that have lowered the
costs of credit evaluation and loan monitoring,
probably have played a role in this change.
risen and its volatility had fallen in the later
period, the spread between the two rates would
have changed. However, this explanation seems
unlikely, since the average spread between the
prime rate and Treasury bill rate impulse re-
sponse functions is negative in the later period.
Moreover, the spread in the later period is only
0.04 percent of the average Treasury bill rate,
whereas the spread in the earlier period was
1.43 percent of the average Treasury bill rate.
Still a useful tool?
Some of the characteristics of the prime rate
that have been mentioned, such as its uniformity,
the infrequency with which it changes, and its
existence as a separate rate from other, wholly
market-determined, benchmark rates, may to
some degree be vestiges of the past. The empiri-
cal evidence discussed above, which appears
to show that the prime rate has become more
closely linked with market interest rates than in
the past, suggests that the familiar characteristics
of the prime rate may begin to disappear. In fact,
some banking industry officials even question its
remaining usefulness and are puzzled by the at-
tention given to it in the press and by the public.
However, as one choice among several bench-
mark options available to borrowers, the prime
rate continues to offer an important tool with
which banks can tailor lending terms to meet
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Most importantly, though, the impulse
response functions are consistent with the view
that the prime rate is more responsive to changes
in the Treasury bill rate in the later period than in
the earlier period. The average spread between
the two response series is greater in absolute
value in the earlier period than in the later
period, by a statistically significant amount
(10 basis points in the earlier period versus
negative 0.3 basis points in the later period).
Of course, it is possible that this change in the
apparent sensitivity ofthe prime rate to market
rates merely is due to changes in the behavior of
the Treasury bill rate, and not to any changes in
the way banks set the prime rate. For example, if
banks continued to set the prime rate at a given
percentage mark-up over the Treasury bill rate,
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